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Breaking Down the Casbaneiro Infection Chain – Part II

Since 2018, the Casbaneiro banking trojan has targeted Latin American financial sectors. Sygnia monitors it closely as a major threat to multi-regional financial organizations.

Executive summary

  • Last year, Sygnia published a blog post describing the Casbaneiro campaign infection chain, based on several investigations conducted by Sygnia’s incident response teams.
  • In 2018, Casbaneiro banking Trojan (also known as Metamorfo, or Ponteiro) surfaced in mass malSpam campaigns targeting Latin America, and focusing on credential theft from financial websites.
  • Based on Sygnia’s observations and recent investigations, the threat actors behind the Casbaneiro campaign have remained active over the past five years, introducing several changes to their attack chain, persistency techniques, and C2 infrastructure.
  • A recent blog post from Talos provided a deep analysis of the tools used in the Casbaneiro campaign. Most of these tools and some of the infrastructure published by Talos were already described in Sygnia’s previous report, with the Talos post describing minor functionality changes.
  • While the threat actors are still making effective use of spear phishing to initiate their infection chain, Sygnia also observed the use of a UAC bypass that enables the threat actors to execute code without triggering a UAC prompt.
  • An analysis of samples related to this campaign that were uploaded to VirusTotal might indicate ongoing concentration in South and North America.

Attack chain updates

In previous Casbaneiro campaigns, the infection chain was initiated by a spear-phishing email containing a malicious PDF attachment that contained a download link to a zip file. In recent attacks observed by Sygnia, the infection chain was initiated by a spear-phishing email containing a malicious HTML  attachment that redirects the target to download a RAR file, as illustrated in Figure 1:

Figure 1 – Updated Casbaneiro attack chain

Another major update in the threat actors’ tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) is the use of a UAC bypass technique to execute code without a UAC prompt, by employing fodhelper.exe
Fodhelper is an executable used by Windows to manage features in its settings, and is often used by attackers to achieve a UAC bypass.
This attack is usually initiated by creating the following registry keys:

  • HKCU:\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command
  • HKCU:\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command\DelegateExecute
  • HKCU:\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command\(default)
Figure 2 – snippet from registry editor showcasing deployment of UAC bypass

Following the creation of the registry keys, the attacker populates a (default) sub-key with the command line.
Once fodhelper.exe is executed, either manually or by navigating to “Manage Optional Features” in Windows, it executes the command line with high integrity execution, thus bypassing the UAC prompt.

Casbaneiro attackers were also observed creating a mock folder on C:\Windows[space]\system32, and copying fodhelper.exe to that folder; however, the use of this path was not detected during Sygnia’s investigation. It is possible that the attacker deployed the mock folder to bypass antivirus detections, or to leverage the folder for side-loaded DLLs with Microsoft-signed binaries for the purposes of bypassing UAC.

Figure 3 – UAC bypass: snippet from PowerShell that creates ‘ms-settings’ registry key and appends
Casbaneiro executable path

C2 Infrastructure

The contactofiscal[.]cfd domain which is embedded in the HTML file (adjuntos_0102_.html) that was sent in the initial email was registered in mid-February 2023, and resolves to a Choopa ASN IP 45.32.90[.]70 which hosts hundreds of additional domains. Several additional domains were created and resolved to the same IP around that time, and are also embedded in HTML files with the same name; this led us to assume that those domains are also part of the current Casbaneiro campaign: factudigital[.]cfd, factdigital[.]shop, and cgdf[.]shop.

Furthermore, during our analysis, we discovered that over 40 files with the same unique HTML file name (adjuntos_0102_.html) were uploaded to VirusTotal since February 2023. All of the files were embedded with one of the four abovementioned domains, and two additional domains: serviciofac[.]shop and fiscalcgdf[.]shop.

The adjunto[.]shop domain also resolved to 45.32.90[.]70; based on its name, we assumed that this domain is also part of the current campaign. The tributaria[.]website domain which was used in later stages of the infection chain, was registered in July 2022 through Tucows Inc. The first resolution of this domain was recorded in mid-August to the IP 172.104.193[.]212, and at the end of November it resolved to the IP 139.177.193[.]74, which hosted it until mid-March 2023.

The Canadian Akamai IP 139.177.193[.]74 also resolved to the ckws[.]info and m9b4s2[.]site domains earlier this year. These domains were part of the malicious infrastructure that was reported by Sygnia in our previous Casbaneiro blog post – although they resolved to different IPs at the time. Additional domains hosted by the same IP which might also be part of recent campaigns include wiqp[.]xyz and live.xtream-ui[.]info.

Based on the information available in VirusTotal, over 20 malicious files communicating with the tributaria[.]website domain were uploaded since August 2022. Most of the files are obfuscated PowerShell scripts – like those described in Sygnia’s previous blog post – and some are CMD files.

Retro-hunt Analysis

Based on the samples collected during recent Casbaneiro investigations, Sygnia’s research team validated and updated three YARA rules that were published in the previous blog post (see Appendix for details). VirusTotal retro-hunt queries for these YARA rules one year back yielded the following results:

  • Casbaneiro_Dropper_Script:
    • A total of 86 samples were retrieved.
    • Most of the samples were uploaded since the beginning of 2023 – approximately 70 samples.
    • 58 samples were uploaded first from Mexico, others were first uploaded from Panama, Spain, Virgin Islands, India and the United States.
  • Casbaneiro_Directory_Script:
    • A total of 170 samples were retrieved.
    • Most of the samples were uploaded since beginning of 2023 – approximately 150 samples.
    • 120 samples were uploaded from the United States, 30 from Mexico, and some were first uploaded from Panama and Canada.
  • Casbaneiro_Trojan_DLL:
    • A total of 16 samples were retrieved.
    • All of the samples were uploaded since February 2023 from the United States.

All samples retrieved from the retro-hunt analysis are listed in the IOCs section below.

Conclusions

  • The Casbaneiro banking Trojan was first identified in mass campaigns targeting financial sectors in Latin America in 2018.
  • Based on Sygnia’s observations the threat actors behind the Casbaneiro campaign are still active to this day, with some changes over the years in their attack chain, C2 infrastructure, and TTPs.
  • The threat actors are still making effective use of spear-phishing attack to initiate their infection chain, and still appear to be focused on Latin American targets.
  • Sygnia continues to track Casbaneiro activity, as it poses a serious threat to multi-regional financial organizations.

To learn more about Sygnia’s Incident Response services click here.

If you are currently being impacted by a cyber incident, or are seeking guidance, please contact us or call our 24/7 hotline +1-877-686-86

Appendices

YARA Rules

Due to minor changes observed in recent Casbaneiro campaign, we have updated some of the YARA rules published in Sygnia’s previous blog post:  

Casbaneiro_Dropper_Script – detects Casbaneiro dropper script.
This rule was adjusted by excluding specific C2 domains that were changed in recent attacks.

rule Casbanerio_Dropper_Script
{
meta:
author = “Sygnia”
copyright = “Sygnia”
date = “21/03/2023”
version = “2.0”
description = “Detects Casbanerio Dropper Script.”
tlp = “WHITE”
strings:
$s1 = “%SystemRoot%” wide ascii
$v1 = “NN=http”
$p1 = “IeX(New-oBJeCt Net.WebClIeNt).DOwnlOadStRING(‘%NN%’)” wide ascii
$p2 = “IeX(New-oBJeCt Net.WebClIeNt).DOwnlOadStRING(‘%NN%’)” wide ascii
$r1 = “%~f0” wide ascii
condition:
$s1 and (1 of ($d) and (1 of ($p) and $r1 and filesize < 1KB))
}

Casbaneiro_Directory_Script – detects Casbaneiro directory script that creates a proprietary folder in the root directory of victim’s station (no changes were made).

rule Casbanerio_Directory_Script
{
meta:
author = “Dan Saunders”
copyright = “Sygnia”
date = “22/02/2022”
version = “1.0”
description = “Detects Casbanerio Directory Script.”
tlp = “WHITE”
strings:
$s1 = “%SystemRoot%” wide ascii
$s2 = “Setlocal EnableExtensions” wide ascii
$s3 = “Setlocal EnableDelayedExpansion” wide ascii
$s4 = “set chars=0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz” wide ascii
$s5 = “Set /P” wide ascii
$s6 = “for /L %%N” wide ascii
$s7 = “for /F %%C” wide ascii
$s8 = “for /F %%F” wide ascii
condition:
all of ($s*) and filesize < 500
}

Casbaneiro_Trojan_DLL – detects decrypted Casbaneiro trojan DLL. This rule was adjusted by adding unique strings and exported function names.

rule Casbanerio_Trojan_DLL
{
meta:
author = “Sygnia”
copyright = “Sygnia”
date = “22/03/2023”
version = “2.0”
description = “Detects Decrypted Casbanerio Trojan DLL.”
tlp = “WHITE”
strings:
$s1 = “LI_ReportExceptionDescription” fullword ascii
$s3 = “” fullword ascii
$s4 = ”        <requestedExecutionLevel” fullword ascii
$s5 = ”        processorArchitecture=\”\”/>” fullword ascii $s7 = “vafptuts” fullword ascii $s8 = ”        publicKeyToken=\”6595b64144ccf1df\”” fullword ascii $s9 = “vgdkkbtw” fullword ascii $s10 = “wuvjoll” fullword ascii $s11 = “6%S%DET” fullword ascii $s14 = “DDDEYYZ” fullword ascii $s16 = “\\ -+G#” fullword ascii $s17 = “kUbiYT9” fullword ascii $s18 = “0 /AP@s” fullword ascii $s19 = “hnnFKK3″ fullword ascii $s20 = ” -|^~~” fullword ascii $f1 = “CmdToArgs” wide ascii $f2 = “JLI_GetStdArgc” wide ascii  $f3 = “JLI_GetStdArgs” wide ascii $f4 = “JLI_Launch” wide ascii $f5 = “JLI_MemAlloc” wide ascii $f6 = “JLI_ReportErrorMessage” wide ascii $f7 = “TMethodImplementationIntercept” wide ascii condition: 8 of ($s) and 7 of ($f*) and filesize < 3MB
}

IOC(S) Indicators of Compromise 

Domains and IPs:

IOC (Indicator of Compromise)TypeDescription
contactofiscal[.]cfdDomainC2 Domain
tributaria[.]websiteDomainC2 Domain
185.183.98[.]135IPC2 IP Address
216.238.82[.]27IPC2 IP Address
45.32.90.70IPC2 IP Address
139.177.193[.]74IPC2 IP Address
factudigital[.]cfdDomainAssumed to be related
factdigital[.]shopDomainAssumed to be related
cgdf[.]shopDomainAssumed to be related
serviciofac[.]shopDomainAssumed to be related
fiscalcgdf[.]shopDomainAssumed to be related
wiqp[.]xyzDomainAssumed to be related
live.xtream-ui[.]infoDomainAssumed to be related

Files collected during investigations:

File nameValueDescription
<COMPUTERNAME>.cmd750e41aad5833f4ceeb5742d8feb8d146ec12b6de78aaaeeb45f4d22e7a4d5e8Dropper
<COMPUTERNAME>y.cmde67043faa4091ed18112c2f601fe83be82fcaf936a08ccea1b6beb4084e0fec1Dropper
jli.dll6E18736CD63C60EC853B55E7BCF5C4540EE7290FCasbaneiro Banking Trojan decrypted
_rfejwp6_K.aiC5E6FFAE9A8EDC7FE4620A61D23F387B06EA63AEAutoIt script encrypted
_rfejwp6_K.exe2A4062E10A5DE813F5688221DBEB3F3FF33EB417Casbaneiro Banking Trojan executable
_rfejwp6_K.ia60AF9D3490A563EC375866FAE5838BFEA0A9C09CCasbaneiro payload encrypted
_rfejwp6_K.ia.a162C493B9F5EC46004F7A5E56CE25B91313487A25Casbaneiro Banking Trojan decrypted
_rfejwp6_K.mdat.a1CC5F29915E6D0A3224B33BA5F7A5FA20B32685C9Casbaneiro Banking Trojan decrypted
_rfejwp6_Ki7.exe615DC2FA827FAB39E16A7E9721F484E7F4D34F8ECasbaneiro Banking Trojan executable
PowerShell script (filename: 1)a46b930daed233b8d929049ace13af189aaec88bStage 1 PowerShell Script
yfmpx__4kUJyRp(7868).rarD141B69CAD07D124707717686F5960186C2D974DStage 1 rar file

HASHes of samples retrieved from YARA rules retro-hunt:

Casbaneiro_Trojan_DLL

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217f234b5faa9f40a5e2522baa13d5125d9786ea14bee59c53053a2b8685b61e
571ff0040c0b51e5887084dea0dc83d917e27591bdb471a16112001e0dcf1d84
9c3d6c38dc2b97a7b0b32dae1a31c5164d309c1f8caa9024d45390b81e8bf2b8
e7b17d3dc876ecdf05abb65a5b51ba77eb4c60fbb2996cd4e959fe33104c05fe
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7c3a0f6c01229bc591d95253da6908206fe743cc217abd32873d4f4959b513d6

Casbaneiro_Dropper_Script

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Casbaneiro_Directory_Script

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